The FRAND Ceremony and the Engagement of Article 102 TFEU in the Licensing of Standard Essential Patents by Jeffery Atik
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 42, Issue 3 Article 6
DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF PROFESSOR ROGER GOEBEL
The FRAND Ceremony and the Engagement
of Article 102 TFEU in the Licensing of
Standard Essential Patents
Jeffery Atik∗
∗
Copyright c© by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley
Electronic Press (bepress). https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
949 
ESSAY 
THE FRAND CEREMONY AND THE 
ENGAGEMENT OF ARTICLE 102 TFEU IN THE 
LICENSING OF STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS 
Jeffery Atik* 
I.  INTRODUCTION ..........................................................949 
II.  THE FRAND OBLIGATION ARISES THROUGH A 
CONTRACTUAL DECLARATION .............................953 
III.  A FRAND OBLIGATION IS ANCHORED IN EU 
COMPETITION LAW ...................................................956 
IV.  THE FRAND CEREMONY ENGAGES ARTICLE 102 
TFEU ..............................................................................960 
A. The Coexistece of EU Competition Law FRAND and 
Private Law FRAND ................................................960 
B. A Change in Status Links EU Competition Law 
FRAND to Private Law FRAND .............................961 
V.   CONCLUSION ..............................................................964 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A Standard Essential Patent (“SEP”) is a patent that must be 
practiced by any firm wishing to commercially deploy a privately-
adopted standard, such as the standards promulgated by the European 
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Guest Professor of Civil Law, Lund University (Sweden). Preliminary versions of this essay 
were presented at the Sixteenth Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Conference held at 
Stanford Law School on August 11-12, 2016; at the Biennial Conference of the American 
Society of International Law’s International Economic Law Interest Group held at Georgetown 
Law School on September 30-October 1, 2016; and at the Annual Conference of the Italian 
Society of Law and Economics held at the University of Torino on December 16-17, 2016. I am 
grateful for the research assistance of Ruth Kwon. 
950 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:3 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”).1 The adoption of a 
standard by a major Standard Setting Organization (“SSO”)2—such as 
ETSI—requires a declaration by a covered SEP-holder that effects a 
legal commitment to license that the SEP on a fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory basis (“FRAND”).3 This gesture—which I describe as a 
“FRAND ceremony”—has multiple legal consequences. The FRAND 
ceremony binds the SEP-holding declarant to the express terms of the 
commitment as a matter of private law (which, in regard to ETSI, is a 
matter of French law). Moreover, the FRAND ceremony establishes 
additional obligations binding on the SEP-holder—sourced in EU 
competition law. The declarant acknowledges the “essentiality” of its 
patent to the practice of the standard, which goes a long way to 
presumptively establishing a “dominant position” under Article 102 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”)4 and 
charging the SEP-holder with “special responsibility.” The holder of a 
SEP incorporated in an ETSI standard (or a standard of most other 
important SSOs) is thus likely bound to make available licenses on 
FRAND (or FRAND-like) terms that overlay or augment the FRAND 
undertaking expressly set out in the FRAND declaration itself. 
This Essay examines the FRAND formulation for determining the 
maximum royalties payable to the holder of a Standard Essential 
Patent, with a focus on EU competition law. The holder undertaking to 
license a SEP on FRAND terms undoubtedly makes a contractual 
commitment. Moreover, the SEP holder affects a change in legal status, 
engaging Article 102 TFEU. There are two related and overlapping sets 
of FRAND obligations now in play: one established by private law 
according to express terms defined by the SEP-holder and the SSO; the 
other flowing from EU competition law. 
There is hardly any point where competition law and intellectual 
property rights collide more directly than in the case of Standard 
 
1.  The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ESTI”) is the pre-eminent 
standard-setting organization for telecommunications standards. ETSI participated in the setting 
of the 3G and 4G/LTE standards, which were the subject of the Smartphone Wars. ETSI’s 
FRAND processes are subject of the Huawei and Unwired Planet cases, discussed in this Essay. 
2.  See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002). 
3.  For the current version of ETSI’s FRAND obligation, see EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. 
STANDARDS INST. § 6, annex 6 (2018). 
4.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102, 
2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter Article 102 TFEU]. 
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Essential Patents. A SEP, like any patent, enjoys a presumption of 
validity and gives its holder a set of commercial exclusivities. These 
exclusivities may operate to generate an economic reward to an 
innovator. A SEP, like any patent, may generate monopoly rents 
reflective of the market power of the covered invention.5 Indeed, SEPs 
are more likely to enjoy significant market power than ordinary patents, 
for reasons to be discussed below, and as such are more likely—in the 
words of Article 102 TFEU—to constitute a “dominant position.”6 
The incorporation of a patent into a widely utilized standard will 
significantly enhance that patent’s market power. Rival technologies, 
that would otherwise check the SEP’s power in the market, fall away 
into competitive irrelevance once the standard is set. A SEP “locks in” 
all users of the standard; they may not avoid practicing the SEP if they 
wish to deploy the associated standard. A SEP holder may “hold up” 
any prospective practitioner of the standard; the amount of royalties the 
SEP holder might then demand will reflect more than the simple value 
of the innovation covered by the patent. The SEP holder can 
expropriate, at least in theory, a considerable amount of the value of 
the standard itself (which necessarily exceeds the value of the 
innovation subject to the patent). 
SSOs have long recognized this vulnerability to opportunistic 
demands by SEP holders. Most significant standard setting exercises—
such as the 3G and 4G/LTE standards established by ETSI—now 
condition the incorporation of a patented technology into an adopted 
standard on the making of a FRAND commitment by the patent 
holder.7 The FRAND undertaking typically binds the SEP holder to 
license its SEP to anyone desiring to practice the standard.8 Moreover, 
any license of the SEP must be on a “fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory” basis.9 
 
5.  Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND and Other 
Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1451 (2015); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 
A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135 (2013). 
6.  Article 102 TFEU. 
7.  See Jeffrey Lewis, What is “FRAND” All About? The Licensing of Patents Essential to 
an Accepted Standard, CARDOZO 2-3 (Jun. 11, 2014), https://cardozo.yu.edu/
sites/default/files/Lewis.WhatIsFrandAllAbout.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8Y7-C4ZM]. 
8.  Stanley M. Besen, Why Royalties for Standard Essential Patents Should Not Be Set by 
the Courts, 15 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 19, 20 (2016). 
9.  Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard 
Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 45 (2015). 
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Within Europe, the legal obligation binding a SEP-holder to 
license the SEP on a fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis has 
twin sources. The first source is easily recognized. A FRAND 
obligation is voluntarily “declared” by the holder of an SEP during the 
standard setting exercise. The SSO sponsoring the adoption of the 
relevant standard will define—in its rules—the terms of the FRAND 
obligation; the SEP declarant essentially checks a box electing 
FRAND. The SEP holder’s FRAND declaration establishes valid legal 
obligations under contract or related theories. From this viewpoint, the 
FRAND obligation is an artifact of private law, and private law will 
largely determine the nature of the scope of the particular FRAND 
obligation. The engagement of FRAND results from the exercise of the 
SEP-holder’s election; in the absence of the FRAND declaration, the 
SEP-holder would be unbound with regard to its patent licensing 
practices. EU courts and the European Commission recognize the 
presence of the SEP-holder’s FRAND declaration in giving rise to the 
legal obligations that attach to the SEP; they presume the declaration is 
essential to the application of FRAND to the SEP. 
The second source of the FRAND obligation is competition law. 
The concept of FRAND, as a response to an exploitative exercise of a 
property right, was first developed in competition law cases in the 
United States10 and the European Union.11 Competition law courts 
applied remedies featuring mandates to concede access to “essential 
facilities” to competitors or others on a FRAND basis.12 While US 
antitrust law has largely retreated from recognition of the essential 
facilities doctrine,13 the doctrine is alive and well under Article 102 
TFEU. Operation of the Intellectual Property (“IP”)-related “essential 
facilities doctrine” under Article 102 TFEU may justify the imposition 
of remedies that resemble FRAND regardless of the presence or 
 
10.  The “essential facilities doctrine” in US antitrust law is traced to United States v. 
Terminal Railroad Assoc. of St. Louis. 224 U.S. 383 (1912). See also Otter Tail Power Co. v. 
United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 
U.S. 585 (1985). 
11.  Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. v. Commission of 
European Communities, 1974 E.C.R. 223. 
12.  Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson & Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities 
Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 446 (2002); see also Marina Lao, 
Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
275, 287 (2013). 
13.  Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); 
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009). 
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absence of a FRAND declaration by the intellectual property rights 
holder. That is, EU competition law may provide an independent 
ground for imposing a FRAND obligation on the holder of a SEP or 
other piece of IP that fits within the EU essential facilities doctrinal 
developments tracing from Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission of the 
European Communities (“Magill”).14 
A reconciliation of these two views—one private law, the other 
public law in nature—can be achieved by cumulating their respective 
legal effects. In most SEP-licensing cases involving a FRAND 
declaration, the consent-based, private law source coexists with 
autonomous, public law obligations rooted in EU competition law. The 
making of a FRAND declaration has more than contractual effects. It 
also effects a change in legal status that directly engages Article 102 
TFEU and is independent—in terms and scope—from any FRAND 
specification explicitly made by the SEP owner or imposed by a 
Standard Setting Organization. The FRAND obligation sourced in 
Article 102 TFEU is paramount—and, where recognized, operates 
without regard to the presence of a potentially narrower FRAND 
obligation generated within the standard setting exercise. This twin-
source approach can be squared with the understandings reflected in 
the Article 102 TFEU cases treating FRAND obligations,15 as well as 
in the November 2017 Commission notice on a common approach to 
SEPs.16 
II. THE FRAND OBLIGATION ARISES THROUGH A 
CONTRACTUAL DECLARATION 
A FRAND undertaking in the standard setting context can be 
viewed as a voluntary commitment, governed by the private law. 
Indeed, this is the conventional understanding. The holder of a patent 
competing for inclusion in a standard engages itself to make licenses 
 
14.  Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Indep. 
Television Publ’ns Ltd (ITP) v Comm’n of the European Communities, 1995 E.C.R. I-743 
[hereinafter Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P]. 
15.  See, e.g., Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v ZTE Corp., 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:477, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62013CJ0170 [https://perma.cc/59VF-J2TE]; Unwired 
Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344.  
16.  Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee: 
Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents, COM (2017) 712 Final (November 
2017). 
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available for practice of that patent to all interested licensees on 
FRAND terms—including firms that had not participated in the 
standard setting exercise. There is something of a contractual quid pro 
quo in this process: the holder of what will become a SEP anticipates a 
broad and perhaps industry-wide deployment of its invention. The 
invention will likely enjoy a considerable market share and will likely 
endure longer upon adoption by the SSO as a standard; both of these 
expectations will likely lead to an increase in the revenues that will be 
generated by the SEP during its term, even when license royalties are 
limited by a FRAND commitment. The SSO incorporating the patent 
into a standard will assure its members (as well as others outside the 
SSO) access to a superior technology (as of the time of the adoption of 
the standard) on reliable commercial terms. 
The Commission in its November 2017 notice understands the 
engagement of a FRAND-based licensing obligation to result once “the 
holders of the SEPs have given a commitment to license them on 
(FRAND) terms. . . .”17 The FRAND declaration by the patent owner 
operates to create the legal obligation to license on FRAND terms. The 
Commission Notice, for the most part, takes a private law view as to 
the source of a binding FRAND commitment. 
In Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp., the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) describes the FRAND 
undertaking made by Huawei, the SEP holder in that case, to ETSI, the 
relevant SSO, as binding.18 The Court points out that Clause 8.1 of 
Annex 6 of ETSI’s Rules of Procedure addresses the case where an 
owner of patent rights refuses to give a FRAND undertaking, making 
clear that a FRAND commitment represents an unconstrained exercise 
of the patent owner’s discretion.19 While Huawei arises under the 
specific circumstances of the Long Term Evolution standard setting 
process conducted by ETSI20, the essential contractual nature of a 
FRAND commitment, in the eyes of the Court of Justice, is likely a 
general case. 
A contract vision of the FRAND undertaking dominates the 
court’s analysis in Unwired Planet International Ltd. v. Huawei 
Technologies Co. Ltd.. The UK High Court (per Justice Birss) 
 
17.  Id. at 1. 
18.   C-170/13, Huawei ¶¶ 74-76. 
19.  Id. at ¶ 18. 
20.  Id. at ¶¶ 12-20. 
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describes three “relevant legal contexts” for the consideration of 
FRAND: “(1) compliance with the FRAND commitment as a matter of 
contract, (2) compliance with competition law and (3) the grant or 
refusal of injunctions.”21 Justice Birss’ concern in Unwired Planet is 
largely on FRAND as a matter of contract. He notes that both the ETSI 
intellectual property rights policy and the form of the FRAND 
declaration provide that the “construction, validity and performance” 
of the FRAND undertaking is governed by French law.22 The High 
Court in Unwired Planet considers various alternative foundations 
under French law—contract or enforceable stipulation or unilateral 
commitment—as to the legal basis for the FRAND commitment and 
concludes that under any of these theories, the FRAND declaration 
creates an enforceable obligation.23 
The pure contract view is seriously misleading. Public law in 
various forms—including patent and competition law—are 
unavoidably part of the FRAND landscape. These bodies of law shape 
the content of the FRAND undertaking and operate as distinct sources 
of limits and bounds on SEP royalty terms. Justice Birss does recognize 
that EU competition law can apply to FRAND commitments24—but in 
his judgment in Unwired Planet it is unclear as to how (and why) 
Article 102 TFEU is engaged. 
It is easy then to assume that the FRAND undertaking is a creature 
of private law, an ordering that is determined within the zone of 
contractual freedom. This view has been coupled with the further 
assertion that public law should not interfere with the free functioning 
of FRAND commitments.25 An exclusion of public law scrutiny might 
arguably represent wise policy. That said, there is little foundation to 
the claim, at least with regard to EU competition law, that private actors 
can, by interposing a set of arrangements, construct a “do not enter” 
zone into which public law may not penetrate. 
 
21.  Unwired Planet Int’l v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) [99] (Eng.). 
22.  See id. at ¶ 100. 
23.  See id. at ¶ 139. 
24.  See id. at ¶¶ 147-57. 
25.  See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Koren W. Wong-Ervin & Joshua D. Wright, The Troubling 
Use of Antitrust to Regulate FRAND Licensing, 10 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 2 (2015). 
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III. A FRAND OBLIGATION IS ANCHORED IN EU 
COMPETITION LAW 
Article 102 TFEU operates as an independent source, which 
imposes duties on a holder of a SEP to license that patent on FRAND 
terms to any undertaking desiring to practice the relevant standard. 
Many SEP holders enter into commitments to license their SEPs on 
FRAND terms as part of the standard setting exercise,26 but the entry 
of these private commitments masks the public obligations imposed by 
EU competition law. Article 102 TFEU is, under many conditions 
involving the licensing of a SEP, a sufficient and independent basis to 
generate a FRAND obligation. That is, the refusal to license a SEP to a 
party wishing to practice a standard will constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position. Moreover, a SEP holder demanding royalties that 
exceed FRAND levels (whatever they may be) may also violate Article 
102 TFEU.27 A SEP likely will constitute a dominant position in the 
narrow technology market covered by the patent’s scope. The SEP may 
also hold a dominant position in the broader market defined by the 
standard that has incorporated the patent. A SEP may be an “essential 
facility,” falling within the well-established reach of Article 102 
TFEU.28 That is, Article 102 TFEU imposes a duty on the SEP 
holder—even in the absence of a FRAND undertaking—to license to 
SEP on FRAND terms. 
In certain circumstances, European competition law imposes a 
duty to license on an owner of intellectual property. In Radio Telefis 
Eireann v. Commission (Magill),29 the CJEU upheld a Commission 
decision imposing a copyright licensing obligation on a group of Irish 
broadcasters. Magill made clear under European competition law that 
in special circumstances30 an IP-holder has a duty to license,31 and that 
license must be on a nondiscriminatory basis. It found three television 
broadcasters operating in Ireland to have violated the predecessor to 
Article 102 TFEU in refusing to license IP-protected material that was 
 
26.  See supra note 7, at 3. 
27.  See Roberto Grasso, Selected Issues in SEP Licensing in Europe: The Antitrust 
Perspectives, in COMPLICATIONS AND QUANDARIES IN THE ICT SECTOR 80 (Ashish Bharadwaj 
et al. eds., 2018). 
28.  See Pitofsky supra, note 12; Lao, supra, note 12. 
29.  Joined Cases C-241/91P & C-242/91P, supra note 14. 
30.  See id. at ¶ 52. 
31.  Id. at ¶ 91. 
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“indispensable” to the development of a new product.32 Magill 
involved copyright33, not patent, and the reach of Irish copyright as a 
matter of law seems rather extravagant (in that it was found to protect 
program listing data). 
Magill’s specification of the conditions where a duty to license 
arises lies at the heart of the case. The refusal to license a copyright in 
these circumstances constitutes the violation of TFEU 102—an 
actionable abuse of a dominant position. A FRAND-like licensing 
obligation is the remedy for this violation. In Magill, the broadcasters 
were refusing to provide detailed program listings for a publisher 
seeking to introduce a comprehensive and comparative weekly 
television guide. The broadcasters attempted to justify their refusal by 
invoking their exclusive rights established by national copyright law.34 
The broadcasters were found to enjoy a dominant position in the market 
for dedicated guides to their own programming.35 In this context, they 
could not block the appearance of a new product (a comparative 
television guide) that would compete with their existing products. The 
information encased in the copyrighted program guides published by 
the broadcasters were essential to the production of a comparative 
television guide. Magill is seen as established an IP-oriented “essential 
facilities doctrine” in EU competition law. 
The Commission, in its decision, had ordered the broadcasters to 
make available by license their copyrighted advance program listings 
“on a non-discriminatory basis.”36 The imposed remedy does not 
include much guidance on what is intended by its non-discrimination 
obligation. Each broadcaster is expressly a beneficiary of the decision, 
in that it is assured access to the advanced program listings of the 
others; the Commission-imposed duty-to-license extends to 
competitors in the broadcast space as well as any publishing firm 
considering production of a comparative television guide.37 
The more recent and more telling story of Article 102-based duty-
to-license is found in the Microsoft Corp. v. Commission 38 decided by 
 
32.  Id. at ¶ 53. 
33.  Id. at ¶ 7. 
34.  Id. at ¶ 34. 
35.  Id. at ¶ 47. 
36.  Commission Decision of 21 December 1988 89/205/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 78) ¶ 27. 
37.  Id. 
38.  Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n of the European Communities, 2007 E.C.R 
II-1491. 
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the General Court. Microsoft is premised on the presence of de facto 
standard constructed around Microsoft’s Windows operating system.39 
Microsoft builds upon Magill and its progeny, and it demonstrates the 
EU’s insistence that an IP-license must be offered on a 
nondiscriminatory basis in situations involving significant competition 
law concerns.40 The General Court in Microsoft upheld the 
Commission’s finding that Microsoft had violated Article 102 TFEU 
by refusing to license “interoperability information” (which was 
covered, in part, by copyright) to its rivals in the Windows work group 
server market.41 
The General Court also upheld the Commission’s finding that 
access to Microsoft’s interoperability information by Sun and other 
competitors was “indispensable” for carrying out the development and 
marketing of work group servers networking Windows-operating 
computers, satisfying the first Magill factor.42 The General Court 
further upheld the Commission’s finding that Microsoft’s refusal to 
provide the copyrighted interoperability information would tend to 
exclude all competition in the market for work group server operating 
systems.43 
The General Court then evaluated the third “exceptional 
circumstances” factor established in Magill: whether Microsoft’s 
conduct prevented the appearance of a new product.44 Article 102(b) of 
the TFEU is given as the source norm generating the circumstances 
where a refusal to deal may constitute an abuse of a dominant position 
(where the conduct is found to be “limiting production, markets or 
technical development to the prejudice of consumers”). The General 
Court significantly expanded the situations where there may be Article 
102 liability for refusal to license from the neatly cabined “new 
product” test set out in Magill: 
 
The circumstances relating to the appearance of a new product, as 
envisaged in Magill and IMS Health . . . cannot be the only 
parameters which determines whether a refusal to license an 
 
39.  Id. at ¶ 32. 
40.  See id. at ¶¶ 807-11. 
41.  Id. at ¶ 103. 
42.  Id. at ¶ 436. 
43.  Id. at ¶ 593. 
44.  Id. at ¶ 643-49. 
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intellectual property right is capable of causing prejudice to 
consumers within the meaning of [Article 102(b) TFEU]. As that 
provision states, such prejudice may arise where there is a 
limitation not only of production or markets, but also of technical 
development.45 
 
The “new product” factor found in Magill and IMS Health 
constituted an Article 102(b) limitation of production or markets; 
Microsoft’s refusal to deal was determined to work a limitation of 
technical development, satisfying Article 102(b) in an unprecedented 
way.46 Microsoft thus demonstrates that the refusal to license category 
of abusive conduct has been enlarged—and is perhaps capable of 
further enlargement. The General Court also made clear that 
consideration of Microsoft’s intellectual property rights did not 
constitute a justification for what was found to be actionable abusive 
conduct.47 
The Microsoft case ended with a set of remedies imposed by the 
Commission, including a compulsory license for Microsoft’s 
interoperability information on “reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms.”48 That is, a non-consensual FRAND-like obligation was 
imposed on Microsoft as a remedy for its Article 102 violation. Further 
proceedings examined whether Microsoft’s licenses properly 
implemented the Commission’s decision and whether the royalties 
charged by Microsoft were excessive.49 This led to a further challenge 
before the General Court.50 Microsoft is currently charging a flat 
US$10,000 upfront royalty and a 0.4% running royalty in the Patent 
License Agreement available under the Microsoft Interoperability 
Program (“MIP”) implemented pursuant to the Interoperability 
 
45.  Id. at ¶ 647. 
46.  See id. 
47.  Id. at ¶¶ 689-91. 
48.  See the discussion of the Commission remedies, including the compulsory license of 
interoperability information in Nicholas Economides and Ioannis Lianos, The quest for 
appropriate remedies in the EC Microsoft cases: a comparataive appraisal, in Luca Rubini (ed.), 
Microsoft on Trial: Legal and Economic Analysis of a Transatlantic Antitrust Case. 
49.  Case T-167/08, Microsoft Corp. v European Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2012:323, 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=08FC5E681DA625
D3931574DB4145507F?text=&docid=124434&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=2398685 [https://perma.cc/P7B8-S7BE]. 
50.  Id. 
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Undertaking entered into by Microsoft and the Commission on 
December 16, 2009.51 
Microsoft shows the remedial character both in the main 
proceedings and in the subsequent challenges to Microsoft’s 
compliance with the initial remedial order. Microsoft remains one of 
the most important investigations brought by the Commission for 
abuses of a dominant position. Access to a SEP in order to practice a 
standard share some of the “exceptional” context found in Magill. A 
standard may or may not enable a “new product,” but the General Court 
seems to have relaxed the “new product” factor in Microsoft. 
IV. THE FRAND CEREMONY ENGAGES ARTICLE 102 TFEU 
A. The Coexistece of EU Competition Law FRAND and Private Law 
FRAND 
If the imposition of FRAND could be viewed as the result of a 
contractual undertaking, it would follow that the contracting parties 
(which includes the SEP holder) would ultimately determine the nature 
and effects of that undertaking. A court examining the actions of a SEP 
holder with regard to a FRAND-committed patent will seek in principle 
to divine the drafting parties’ intentions in interpreting the scope of the 
FRAND commitment.52 The parties could condition the FRAND 
obligation; they might subject, for example, an extension of a FRAND 
license of the SEP to a reciprocating FRAND offer to access 
technology controlled by the potential licensee. Or the parties might 
limit the benefit of the FRAND commitment to certain parties; they 
might restrict FRAND terms to participating members of the SSO 
sponsoring the relevant standard. If FRAND is essentially contractual 
in nature, the parties could exercise wide latitude under general notions 
of freedom of contract (or analogous private law doctrines found in 
national law). 
This posture changes dramatically if the FRAND obligation arises 
from Article 102 TFEU. In this case, specifying the scope and effects 
of the FRAND obligation becomes a matter of judicial prerogative 
(given that Article 102 forms part of the TFEU, the highest order of EU 
 
51.  See European Commission Press Release IP/07/1567, Antitrust: Commission ensures 
compliance with 2004 Decision against Microsoft (Oct. 22, 2007); see also Economides & 
Lianos, supra note 48, at 423-24.  
52.  See, e.g., Unwired Planet Int’l, [2017] EWHC 711, supra note 21, ¶ 783. 
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law). If Article 102 TFEU generates an obligation on the SEP holder to 
license on FRAND terms, it is for the EU judiciary to define that 
obligation. The intent or understanding of the parties participating in 
the standard setting exercise—including that of the SEP holder—are of 
little importance. They certainly do not have the power to restrict, 
condition or otherwise limit the scope of any FRAND duty arising 
under Article 102 TFEU. 
In many situations, the FRAND obligation assumed by contract 
will co-exist alongside a FRAND (or perhaps FRAND-like) set of 
“special responsibility” duties imposed by EU competition law. Article 
102 TFEU is mandatory law, of course, and a firm cannot escape the 
reach of Article 102 by the expedient of a unilateral declaration. Article 
102 FRAND constitutes a minimum obligation; the contract form of 
FRAND stipulated within the standard setting exercise can only 
increase the obligation sourced in competition law; it cannot relax it. 
In Unwired Planet, Justice Birss seems to understand co-existence 
along these lines. In his discussion of the “fair and reasonable” element 
in FRAND, he finds that a contract-sourced FRAND obligation 
provides for a lower single FRAND price that falls below the 
“excessive pricing” zone set by Article 102 TFEU.53 In his view, the 
ETSI-specified form of FRAND imposes a more severe restriction of 
the royalty rate that can be demanded by the SEP-holder than the 
avoidance of excessive pricing imposed by Article 102 TFEU.54 He 
may or may not be correct as to where an ETSI declarant’s royalty must 
be set in comparison to the maximum royalty rate permitted by 
competition law. Regardless, Justice Birss makes explicit that the 
private law obligation to charge no greater than FRAND royalties co-
exists with royalty limits resulting from the special responsibility owed 
by the SEP-holder imposed by Article 102 TFEU. 
B. A Change in Status Links EU Competition Law FRAND to 
Private Law FRAND 
Article 102 TFEU is present in both Huawei and Unwired Planet, 
but neither the Court of Justice in Huawei nor the High Court in 
Unwired Planet give much attention to how Article 102 TFEU is 
engaged. Perhaps Article 102 attaches according to its own principles 
 
53.  Id. at ¶ 153. 
54.  Id. 
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in these cases. That is, each case involves the possession of a dominant 
position and behavior that satisfies the Article 102 notion of abuse. 
In Huawei, an Article 267 TFEU referral to the CJEU from the 
Landgericht Düsseldorf, the referring court stipulates that the existence 
of Huawei’s dominant position “is not in dispute” in the national 
proceedings.55 The CJEU addresses an asserted Article 102 TFEU 
abuse of that dominant position involving Huawei’s bringing of an 
action for a prohibitory injunction, based on the unauthorized practice 
by ZTE of Huawei’s SEP.56 The CJEU describes the steps by which 
Huawei notified its patent57 to ESTI, and Huawei’s simultaneous 
undertaking to grant licenses to third parties on FRAND terms.58 One 
may infer then that it is this undertaking—and ETSI’s subsequent 
incorporation of Huawei’s into ETSI’s Long Term Evolution 
standard—that establishes Huawei’s dominant position from which 
Article 102 TFEU exposure flows. 
It would be helpful to view the engagement of Article 102 TFEU 
as flowing automatically from the making of a FRAND declaration 
within the standard setting exercise. The imposition of Article 102 
“special responsibility”—duties to avoid abusive conduct—results 
from the SEP-holder’s undertaking. That is, a FRAND declaration has 
legal consequences beyond the mere establishment of contractual 
obligations. A FRAND declaration constitutes a shift in legal status—
transforming an ordinary patent to one invested with standard 
essentiality—that calls Article 102 TFEU into play. 
A FRAND declaration accompanies an assertion by the holder of 
a candidate SEP that the concerned patent is essential to the practice of 
the standard. This is largely a unilateral act; SSOs, at least initially, do 
not verify these assertions of essentiality.59 The FRAND commitment 
“ceremony” is better described as involving both the assertion of 
essentiality of the SEP and the assumption of the obligation to license 
 
55.  See, e.g., Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies, supra note 15.  
56.  Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies, supra note 15. 
57.  Huawei’s patent is identified as EP 2 090 050 B 1, bearing the title “Method and 
apparatus of establishing a synchronization signal in a communications system.” Case C-170/13, 
Huawei Technologies, supra note 15. 
58.  The relevant ‘FRAND ceremony’ occurred on March 4, 2009. Case C-170/13, Huawei 
Technologies, supra note 15. 
59.  See How To Check The Essentiality Of A Standard Essential Patent, GREYB (Jun. 26, 
2018), https://www.greyb.com/checking-essentiality-sep/ [https://perma.cc/J9Q2-W6SN]. See 
also CYBER CREATIVE INDUSTRIES CO., EVALUATION OF LTE ESSENTIAL PATENTS DECLARED 
TO ETSI 16 (Jun. 2013). 
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the SEP on FRAND terms. The FRAND commitment ceremony 
presumptively satisfies the tests proposed by Magill and Microsoft. The 
elements that must be established in order to demonstrate a refusal to 
license IP as an abuse are (1) access to the IP is indispensable in order 
to access a market, (2) the refusal to provide access would exclude all 
competition and (3) “exceptional circumstances.” 
Indispensability is a primary element in the finding of an Article 
102 TFEU violation for failure to license the holder’s intellectual 
property. Whether an asserted SEP is indeed essential to the practice of 
a standard requires a complex factual assessment, but the owner is 
likely to have knowledge in its possession as to whether this test is 
satisfied. Moreover, the mere assertion of essentiality within the 
FRAND commitment ceremony should be sufficient, at a minimum, to 
raise a presumption of indispensability to satisfy the test set out in 
Magill and Microsoft. 
Many if not most standards involving a complex of technologies 
will occupy a competitive field. The Windows standard developed by 
Microsoft was the result of a mix of technological prowess, aggressive 
business practices and good luck. There was no significant market for 
work group servers that did not involve Windows. Similarly, the 3G 
and LTE standards promulgated by ETSI (which were the subject of 
the Huawei and Unwired Planet cases) completely dominated global 
telecommunications market. A patent that is essential for 
commercialization within a standardized market will satisfy the second 
factor. 
Recall that Microsoft relaxed the demand in Magill that the refusal 
to license prevent the appearance of a new product. Microsoft was 
supplying the market of interest (Windows interoperable work group 
server software) that its rivals wished to enter. Yet Microsoft’s refusal 
to license the copyrights Windows interoperability information was 
found to be “limiting production, markets or technical developments to 
the . . . prejudice of consumers.”60 A SEP holder who would refuse to 
license its SEP to a party wishing to practice the related standard would 
have an analogous effect. Together, the FRAND commitment 
ceremony – marked by both the declaration of standard essentiality and 
the FRAND commitment – provide a basis to directly engage Article 
102 TFEU, exposing the SEP-holder to competition law liability for 
 
60.  See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp., supra note 38, at ¶ 643. 
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any failure to license the SEP on FRAND terms defined by competition 
law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Standard-essential patents attract FRAND-like discipline, at least 
as a matter of European competition law, beyond the private law 
obligations assumed by their holders. This compounds the dilemma of 
multiple, and perhaps conflicting, tests applied to any particular SEP 
license. In addition to the prospect of different national courts applying 
inconsistent national tests as to whether a particular set of terms is or is 
not FRAND, there is the further possibility of difference between the 
FRAND elements autonomously imposed by public law (such as EU 
competition law) and similar obligations resulting from the operation 
of a private law undertaking. 
Magill suggests the FRAND commitment should not be 
considered as merely a private, contractual undertaking. Public law, 
such as EU competition law, may independently impose a duty of 
license a SEP on FRAND terms. If FRAND is, even in part if not in 
parallel, a public obligation, then it is more likely to convey public 
concerns. What then are the public concerns conveyed by Magill? The 
first is the appearance of a new product. This might stretch a FRAND 
obligation forward into new technologies that lie beyond the standard 
as currently practiced. Second, access to the patent must be 
indispensable. This opens an inquiry as to whether “essential” as 
understood in a private standard setting is the same as “indispensable” 
within the meaning of Magill. Magill establishes that “essential 
facilities” arguments with regard to intellectual property may sound in 
particular circumstances under Article 102 TFEU and that a remedial 
award should have FRAND-like characteristics. 
The FRAND ceremony provides a bright line marking the taking 
on of special responsibility under Article 102 TFEU. The making of a 
FRAND declaration constitutes a profound change in the legal status 
of a patent, as it transforms from mere patent to SEP and accretes 
greater market power. The FRAND ceremony’s transformational effect 
is premised on the patent’s essentiality (or indispensability) for the 
practice of a standard that will have substantial market power. Within 
the technology market corresponding to each SEP, the SEP-holder 
holds a “dominant position.” FRAND or FRAND-like duties attach to 
the SEP that co-exist—and may exceed—the explicit FRAND 
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commitment contained in the declaration that underlies the FRAND 
ceremony. 
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